CHAPTER VI. THE INTRINSIC LAW OF THE FACULTY OF APPREHENSION.
We have now carefully considered the acts and dynamic activity of human
thought. We have seen in what animal and human perception consists, and
how it acts; how the subjects developed in our imagination are gradually
united in specific forms or types, and are arranged in a system, whence
follow the first symbolic representations of science. But our task is not
yet accomplished, since much more is needed to display all that this fact
involves, so that we may fully understand the inward evolution of myth and
science in history and in our race, and not merely in the individual man.
The faculty and its effects, which could primarily be reduced to this
unique and indivisible fact, do not exclusively belong to primordial ages,
but go on through all time, our own included, while assuming divers forms
and fresh aspects as the faculty of the intellect becomes more developed.
It is an indisputable truth that the influence of myth on thought and
fancy, a survival from prehistoric ages, still prevails among the common
people both in town and country, among those who are uncultivated, and
even in the higher classes conventionally called good society.
It is more difficult to trace the occasional existence of the same
influence among those who think rationally and investigate the laws of the
universe while acquainted with the earlier mythical process; and yet, as
we shall show, the greatest and most able men are not unfettered by it.
Myth has hitherto been regarded as a secondary and fanciful product of the
psychical human faculty, due to extrinsic impulses, rather than as the
primitive and intrinsic necessity of the intelligence--a necessity which
has its roots in animal intelligence itself; and the unique fact which
generates both myth and science has not been ascertained. If this fact and
law had been discovered before, we should have more readily understood
religions, philosophic systems, and the successive forms of science, and
pure reason would have made more rapid progress. Our theory, besides
giving a rational explanation of the different forms assumed by thought in
the course of its historic evolution, will, I hope, also account for many
psychological phenomena which have hitherto been imperfectly understood,
such as dreams, hallucinations, the aberrations of insanity, and the like.
The primitive fact and its effects reappear in these conditions, and this
influence is persistent and enters into all our acts, conscious or
unconscious, voluntary or involuntary.
It follows from the innate necessity of the perception that objects and
their extrinsic and intrinsic causes are resolved into living subjects,
and are classified in a hierarchy of specific types, which are accepted by
the primitive and ignorant mind as the universal mythical forms.[26] But
the necessities of human speech, which is however involved in mythical
representations, from the very beginning essentially reflex, require other
terms than those of individual and specific animations. It is clear that
the simple personifying faculty of the intellect sufficed in its earliest
emotions, but that after the slow development of psychical reduplication,
and the enlargement of languages and ideas, it no longer satisfied the
logical requirements of the mind.
Consequently, explicit,--that is, rational--singular, and specific ideas
gradually arose and assumed a definite form; they were interwoven and
fused into these individual and specific types, and thus obtained a place
in the thoughts and language of primitive man. The gradual intrusion of
specific rational ideas is natural to the human mind, since it is
logically progressive, and the fact may be observed by those who watch the
mental growth of children, and of ignorant and untaught adults.
While the mythical intelligence continues as before to give its habitual
mythical interpretation of many natural phenomena, the use is gradually
acquired of special and generic symbols which express special and specific
ideas, and these no longer include a personification of the individual
thing or idea. Without this intrusion of rational ideas any progress would
be impossible, as well as the power of expressing all which time and
education present to the mind, and gradually enable it to comprehend; the
fanciful image is fused in a rational conception, which is, however, not
yet definite and explicit.
What are commonly termed abstract ideas arise from this necessity, as the
result of the perfection and development of speech, but these were not at
first abstract, although they made use of the abstract idea.
Unconscious abstraction is certainly one of the primary acts of the
intelligence, since abstraction follows from the consideration of a part
or of some parts of a whole, which are themselves presented as a whole to
the perception. But this primitive abstraction was so far a concrete fact
for the perception, in that each act of the apprehension constituted a
phenomenon of which the apparent character was abstracted from the other
parts which formed a whole, and was transformed into a living subject, as
we have already shown at length. The really explicit abstraction, to which
man only attained after many ages, consisting in the simple representation
of a quality or part of a thing, could not at that time be effected,
although special and specific ideas gradually found their way into thought
and speech. All the terms for form and relation in primitive speech, and
also among modern savages, confirm this assertion, as linguists are aware;
the form and relation now expressing an abstract reference to actions and
passions in the verbs, nouns, and adverbs, originally referred to a
concrete object.
Three modes or degrees of abstract representations occur in the
progressive exercise of the intellectual faculty; these, combined with the
special apprehensions of the individual memory, and with imaginative
types, constitute the life of human thought, and are the conditions by
which we attain to rational knowledge. While the specific mythical type
may take the place of the general type in the logical exercise of thought,
and may suffice for an imaginative comprehension of the system of the
world, the abstract conception intervenes in the daily necessity for
communication between these general mythical types, and serves to cement
them together, thus rendering the commerce of ideas among men and in the
human mind more easy.
The abstract conceptions which are formed in this way may be divided into
three classes--physical, moral, and intellectual. To begin with the first;
it is impossible for human speech to point out and define a subject or
phenomenon in the series to which it belongs by resemblance, identity, or
analogy, unless there is already in the mind a conception which includes
the general qualities, or quality proper to the series of similar
phenomena; this is essentially an abstract type, but it primarily assumes
a concrete form. I cannot say that anything is white or heavy, until by
repetitions of the same sensation I have been able to combine in a single
conception the sensations diffused over an infinite number of objects. The
genesis of these conceptions is found in the comparative explicit judgment
which depends on the memory for the necessary conditions of its formation.
The typical and abstract idea of white has not merely a nominal value, as
it is asserted in some schools of thought, for an empty term could express
no idea, whereas this idea is perfectly clear. Neither is it a real thing,
but rather an ideal reality, not a pure abstraction of the spirit,
extracted, so to speak, from the material substance. The conception of
whiteness formed by the comparative judgment is limited by the perception
of the concrete, external fact perceived as one special quality among all
other qualities in nature, and it is therefore a physiological fact of
inward consciousness.
In the abstract idea of white or whiteness we do not only picture to
ourselves a quality common to many things, but by this term, and by the
idea which corresponds to it, the same sensation is actually present to
our inward intuition, or the same quality of the sensation which was
previously generated by our external senses in a concrete form.
Although, therefore, the idea is generic, the sensation itself is
represented to the mind in the form of a concrete perception. It is not
concrete in the sense of belonging to a special object or definite form,
as it is presented to the outward perception, but only so far as there is
actually an inward and physiological sensation of whiteness, which the
word recalls to the memory. There can be no mental confusion with the
quality of red, or of any color, when I speak or think of what is white.
When I speak or think of any object as white, I and others perfectly
understand what is meant, and a representation of this quality is
instantly formed in our minds, in the generic type which was gradually
constituted by primitive man by the combination of numerous special
sensations, obvious to the sight, and subsequently expressed in speech.
In order that the word which corresponds to the quality may have a given
sense, it is necessary to perceive the form of the concrete sensation
which gave rise to it; for although the representation is indefinite or
generic, that is, not obvious to the external senses, yet it is not
physiologically distinct from the sensation of the quality described; the
perception of that quality is present by the aid of memory to the inner
consciousness.
It is therefore evident that the physiological elements of consciousness
are actually contained in so-called abstract ideas, although it is
sometimes asserted that they are purely spiritual and intellectual acts,
remote from every physiological process of fact and sense. An actual
physiological fact (color in this instance) corresponds to the idea in
the nervous centers, and reproduces the sensation due to the perception of
special objects, whose physical quality of whiteness we have perceived,
and this sensation makes part of the abstract, or rather indefinite
conception.
In fact, all which is not actually present to the mind--and the present is
an infinitesimal fraction of knowledge--is reproduced by the memory, and
this is effected by the molecular movements of the human brain, and by
what may be called the ethereal modifications which took place when the
sensations, perceptions, and acts first occurred. If the cells vibrate,
and the organs of the brain are affected by the recollection of past ideas
and acts, just as when they actually occurred (and this appears from
Schiff's experiences as to the increase of the brain in heat and volume
during dreams), this vibration will be still more marked when any quality
which affects our senses is reproduced in the mind.
The particular _form_ of the quality as it appears in a definite object is
certainly wanting in the abstract conception; it remains in the first
stage of pure sensation, like a spontaneous act of observation, and it is
transformed into apprehension by the mental faculty. But the inward
consciousness of the quality is actual, psychical, and physical. The
abstract conception is a psychical symbol composed of idea and
consciousness, or rather of act and consciousness; both are fused into a
logical conception of indefinite form, yet consisting of real elements,
that is, of cerebral motions and of sensations.
Estimated according to its genuine value, therefore, an abstract
conception may be divided into three classes--physical, moral, and
intellectual. Whiteness and colors in general, levity and weight,
hardness, sound, and the like qualities, are all abstract types which
belong to the physical class. Goodness, virtue, love, hatred, and anger
must be assigned to the moral class; and equality, identity, number, and
quantity, etc., to the intellectual class. Such abstract conceptions,
without which human speech would be impossible, did not in the case of
primitive man take the explicit and reflex form in which they are
presented by mature science, and it is expedient to inquire what character
they really assumed in the spontaneous exercise of thought and speech.
There is certainly a difference between the mythical and specific types
and the intrinsic value of these abstract conceptions. The former served
for the causative interpretation of the living system of the world, and
had a superstitious influence on the moral and social progress of mankind;
the latter were merely the instrument of thought and speech, and were in
spontaneous and daily use. But in spite of this difference, there was no
radical and substantial diversity in the genesis of such conceptions, and
the fundamental elements of perception were common to both. While the form
varied, the primitive law and genesis remained the same.
We have shown that the perception of the phenomenon, as it affects the
inner and external consciousness, necessarily involves the form of the
subject, and the causative power which animates that form, and this
becomes the intellectual source of special and specific myths. These
myths, whether they are derived from physical or moral phenomena, are
subsequently so completely impersonated as to be resolved into a perfectly
human form. In the case of the abstract conceptions necessary in speech,
such anthropomorphism does not generally occur; yet we see that sensation
and a physiological genesis are inseparable from an abstract conception.
Without such sensation of the phenomenon these conceptions would be
unintelligible to the percipient himself and to others. In direct
sensation, the phenomenon is external, and when it is reproduced in the
mind the same cerebral motions to which that sensation was due are
repeated.
It is an absolute law, not only of the human mind but of animal
intelligence, that the phenomenon should generate the implicit idea of a
thing and cause, and the necessity of this psychical law is also apparent
in the abstract conception of some given quality. If the effect is not
identical, it is at any rate analogous. Primitive man did not take
whiteness, for example, considered in itself, to be an active subject,
like the specific natural myths which we have mentioned, but he regarded
it as something which had a real existence, and he might under certain
circumstances invest it with deliberate power.
If we have fully grasped this deep faculty of the mind, and the
spontaneous animation of all phenomena, both external and internal, it
will not be difficult to understand the reappearance of the same law in
abstract conceptions. The sensation of the quality, and consequently of
the phenomenon, is reproduced, and the phenomenon generates the implicit
idea of a subject, and therefore of a possible cause in given
circumstances. If such a law did not produce upon man the mythical
personification of his primitive abstract conceptions, at any rate it
involved a belief in the objective reality of these conceptions, which
were implicitly held to possess an independent existence.
Among prehistoric and savage races, who were ignorant of the laws and
nature of cosmic forces, the greater or less weight of a thing did not
involve any examination of the mass of a phenomenon, its distance, and the
general laws of gravity; this differential weight was itself believed to
be a thing which acted, and sometimes deliberately, acted in different
ways on the different objects which they were comparing at the moment. In
other words, gravity was regarded as something which existed independently
of the bodies in which its properties were manifested.
This estimate of gravity, as an abstract quality or property, might be
repeated of all other physical properties, as well as of those abstract
conceptions which are moral and intellectual. Goodness came to be
considered as a type, varying indeed in different peoples, according to
their race, and their local, moral, and civil conditions, but as a type
which corresponded to the mutual relations of men, and to their
superstitions and religious beliefs as to the nature of things.
In this case also the abstract conception of the good, the fitting, the
useful, which constantly recur in popular speech are regarded, not as
mythical powers personified in a human form, but as having a real
existence in nature, as something extrinsic to the person or thing in
which they are manifested, and as acting upon them as a living and
causative power. The same may be said of all other abstract conceptions.
Hence, in addition to the formation of cosmic, moral, and intellectual
myths, fashioned after the pattern of humanity, logical conceptions
arose in the mind, necessary for the exercise of human speech and for a
man's converse with himself, and these were regarded as having a real
existence, manifested in things and persons and in the system of nature.
These entities have their origin in the same faculty as the others; in
every conception presented to the mind and reproducing the primitive
sensation or emotion, the external or internal phenomenon implicitly
generates the subject, and with this the cause. These abstract
conceptions did not and do not result in the anthropomorphism of
phenomena or ideas, but are transformed into entities which have a real
existence.
We must also observe the mobility and interchangeableness of these
fetishes, myths, and imaginary entities in the primitive times of the
human race, and even in later ages; at one time the fetish acts as a
myth, at another the myth has a logical existence. Of this there are
many proofs in the traditions of ancient peoples, in the intellectual
life of modern savages, and in that of the civilized nations to which we
ourselves belong. The historic development does not always follow the
regular course we have just described, although these are, in a strictly
logical sense, the necessary stages of intellectual evolution.
Historically they are often jostled and confounded together by the
lively susceptibility and alacrity of the imagination of primitive man,
and it is precisely this characteristic which makes these marvelous
ages so fertile in fanciful creations, and also in scientific
intuitions.
Any one who is sufficiently acquainted with the ancient literature of
civilized peoples, and with the legends of those which are rude and
savage; any one who has reflected on the spontaneous value of words and
conceptions in modern speech, must often have observed how myth assumed
the form of a logical conception as time went on; and conversely how
the logical entity assumed the form of a myth, and how interchangeable
they are. It is well known that the myths have been so far adapted to
the necessities of speech as to be transmuted into verbs; _libare_ from
_liber_, which perhaps came in its turn from _liba_, a propitiatory
cake, while _Libra_ was the genius who in mythological ages presided
over fruitfulness and plenty. So again _juvare_, from the root _jov_,
after it had already been used for the anthropomorphic _Jove_. We find
in Plautus the verb _summanare_, from the god _Summanus_, the nocturnal
sky. Not only verbs but adjectives were derived in common speech from
the mythical names of gods; from _Genius_, a multiform and universal
power in ancient Latin mythology, we have _genialis_ and hence the
expressions _genialis lectus_, _genialis homo_, _genialis hiems_, and
poets and philosophers apply the same epithet even to the elements and
the stars. On the other hand, Virtue, Faith, Piety, and other like moral
conceptions, first regarded as real, yet impersonal entities, were
transformed into a perfect myth, and into human forms worthy of divine
worship.
Even in our own time, and not only among the uneducated people but among
men of high culture--when they do not pause to consider the real value
of words in the familiarity of daily conversation--any one who seeks for
the direct meaning of the terms he uses will admit the truth of what I
say. We constantly ascribe a real existence to abstract conceptions and
qualities, treating them as subjects which have a substantial being, and
which act for the most part with deliberate purpose, although they are
not transformed as in the case of myths into human shapes.
In abstract, intellectual conceptions, such as those of equality,
distance, number, and the like, the same faculty and the same elements
are at work as in those which express physical and moral qualities.
These conceptions, which as civilization advances ultimately become mere
intellectual symbols necessary for logical speech, are at first formed
by the actual comparison of things, and therefore by the aid of the
senses. Even if we were to assert with some schools of thought that they
were formed _a priori_ in the mind, sensation would still be necessary
as the occasion of displaying them. When such conceptions are expressed
in words there is a physiological recurrence to the mind of what may be
termed the shadow of previous sensations or perceptions, which are
united in an intellectual type to give rise to such conceptions. And in
the appearance of this phenomenal basis, thought unconsciously fulfils
the fundamental law of assuming, or I might say of actually _feeling_,
the reality of the subject.
It must be remembered that in speaking of these entities created by the
intellect, I refer to the primitive ages of human thought, or to the
notions of ignorant people, and also to the spontaneous language of
educated men, who in ordinary conversation do not pause to consider the
simple and logical value of their expressions. We are only giving the
natural history of the intelligence, which necessarily excludes the
analytic and refining processes of rational science. An educated man
will, for example, say or write that identity is a most important
principle of logic as well as that of contradiction, although he is
perfectly aware that such expressions only imply an abstract form of
cognition; he follows the natural and primitive process of the
intellect, and for the moment expresses these conceptions as if they
were real entities in the organism of science and of the world. Any one
may find a proof of this fact in himself, if he will consider the ideas
immediately at work in his mind at the moment of expressing similar
conceptions. And if this is true of those who pursue a rational course
of thought, it is true in a still more imaginative and mythical sense at
the dawn of intellectual life, both among modern savages and in the case
of the ignorant common people.
Let us briefly sum up the truth we have sought to establish. Special
fetishes first had their origin by the innate exercise and historical
development of the human intelligence, by the necessary conditions of
the perception, and of subsequent apprehension; these were only the
animation of each external or internal phenomenon, as it occurred, and
this was the primitive origin of myth, both in man and animals. In the
case of animals the fetish or special myth is transitory, appearing and
disappearing in accordance with his actual perceptions; while in man
there is a persistent image of the fetish in his mind, to which he
timidly ascribes the same power as to the thing itself. The specific
types of these fetishes naturally arise from the mental combination of
images, emotions, and ideas into a whole, and these impersonations
generate the various forms of anthropomorphic polytheism. As the
synthetic mental process goes on, these varied forms of polytheism are
gradually united in one general but still anthropomorphic form, which is
commonly called monotheism.
In addition to these spontaneous and anthropomorphic myths, which serve
for the fanciful explanation of the system of the world, and the moral
ideas of social and individual life, other myths arise which are not
anthropomorphic, but which ascribe a substantial existence to abstract
conceptions of physical, moral, or intellectual matters; conceptions
necessary for the formulation of human speech. For although primitive
languages, of which we have some examples remaining in the language of
savage peoples, are almost inconceivably concrete, yet speech is
impossible without expressions of form, or abstract conceptions which
are moulded and adapted to that intuition of the relations of things
which is always taking place in the mind.[27] The mythical human form
does not indeed appear in these conceptions, but a substantial entity is
involved in them which sometimes, as we have seen, may even assume the
aspect of a complete myth.
A careful analysis of the process of our intelligence has shown that
this habitual personification of the phenomenon or abstract conception
is due to the innate faculty of perception, since the appearance of any
phenomenon necessarily produces the idea of a subject actuated by
deliberate purpose; this law is equally constant in the case of animals,
in whom, however, it does not issue in a rational conception. The
objection of ourselves into nature, the personification of its phenomena
and myths in general, are common to all, while they take a more fanciful
form in the case of primitive man; they are the constant and necessary
result of the perception of external and internal phenomena. This
personification includes moral and intellectual as well as physical
phenomena, and it always proceeds in the same way, from special
phenomena to specific types, and hence to abstract perceptions.
In this way we have established the important fact that the primitive
personification of every external or internal phenomenon, the origin of
all myths, religions, and superstitions, is accomplished by the same
necessary psychical and physical law as that which produces sensation.
That is, men, as well as animals, begin by thinking and feeling in a
mythical way, owing to the intrinsic constitution of their intellectual
life; and while animals never emerge from these psychical conditions,
men are gradually emancipated from them, as they become able to think
more rationally, thus finding redemption, truth, and liberty by means of
science.
We now propose to unite in a single conception this necessity of our
intellect, at once the product and the cause of perception, and of the
spontaneous vivification of phenomena; since the law may be expressed in
a compendious form.
Both in physical, moral, and intellectual myths, and in the substantial
entity infused into abstract conceptions, the external or internal
phenomenon immediately generates the idea of a subject, since it is a
fundamental law of our mind to _entify (entificare)_ every object of our
perception, emotion, or consciousness. If any one should object to this
neologism, in spite of its adequate expression of the original function
of the intelligence, we reply that the use and necessity of the verb
_identify_ have been accepted in the neo-Latin tongues, and therefore
_entify_, which has the same root and form, can hardly be rejected,
since it, like the former, signifies an actual process of thought. We
therefore adopt the word without scruple, since new words have often
been coined before when they were required to express new conceptions
and theories.
The primitive and constant act of all animals, including man, when
external or internal sensation has opened to them the immense field of
nature, is that of _entifying_ the object of sensation, or, in a word,
all phenomena. Such _entification_ is the result of spontaneous
necessity, by the law of the intrinsic faculty of perception; it is not
the result of reflection, but it is immediate, innate, and inevitable.
It is an eternal law of the evolution of the intelligence, like all
those which rule the order of the world.
We do not only proclaim in this fact a law of psychological importance,
but also the origin of myths, and in a certain sense of science, since
myth is developed by the same methods as science. These two streams flow
from one and the same source, since the _entification_ of phenomena is
proper both to myth and science; the former _entifies_ sensations, and
the latter ideas, since science by reversion to law and rational
conception finally attains to the primitive entity. And finally, if an
imaginative idea of a cause is active in myth from the first, the
conception of a cause is equally necessary to science. It is her
business to explain the reason of things, and in what they rationally
consist:
"Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas." |
