CHAPTER I: THE IDEAS AND SOURCES OF MYTH
Myth, as it is understood by us, and as It will be developed and explained
in this work, cannot be defined in summary terms, since its multiform and
comprehensive nature embraces and includes all primitive action, as well
as much which is consecutive and historical in the intelligence and
feelings of man, with respect to the immediate and the reflex
interpretation of the world, of the Individual, and of the society in
which our common life is passed.
We hold that myth is, in its most general and comprehensive nature, the
spontaneous and imaginative form in which the human intelligence and human
emotions conceive and represent themselves and things in general; it is
the psychical and physical mode in which man projects himself into all
those phenomena which he is able to apprehend and perceive.[1] We do not
propose to consider in this treatise the myths peculiar to one people, nor
to one race; we do not seek to estimate the intrinsic value of myths at
the time when they were already developed among various peoples, and
constituted into an Olympus, or special religion; we do not wish to
determine the special and historical cause of their manifestations in the
life of any one people, since we now refrain from entering on the field of
comparative mythology. It is the scope and object of our modest researches
to trace the strictly primitive origin of the human myths as a whole; to
reach the ultimate fact, and the causes of this fact, whence myth, in its
necessary and universal form, is evolved and has its origin.
We must therefore seek to discover whether, in addition to the various
causes assigned for myth in earlier ages, and still more in modern times
by our great philologists, ethnologists, and philosophers of every
school--causes which are for the most part extrinsic--there be not a
reason more deeply seated in our nature, which is first manifested as a
necessary and spontaneous function of the intelligence, and which is
therefore intrinsic and inevitable.
In this case myth will appear to us, not as an accident in the life of
primitive peoples varying in intensity and extent, not as a vague
conception of things due to the erroneous interpretation of words and
phrases, nor again as the fanciful creation of ignorant minds; but it will
appear to be a special faculty of the human mind, inspired by emotions
which accompany and animate its products. Since this innate faculty of
myth is indigenous and common to all men, it will not only be the portion
of all peoples, but of each individual in every age, in every race,
whatever may be their respective conditions.
Myth, therefore, will not be resolved by us into a manifestation of an
obsolete age, or of peoples still in a barbarous and savage state, nor as
part of the cycle through which nations and individuals have, respectively
passed, or have nearly passed; but it remains to this day, in spite of the
prevailing civilization which has greatly increased and is still
increasing, it still persists as a mode of physical and intellectual force
in the organic elements which constitute it.
Nor, let it be observed, do I say that such a mythical faculty persists as
such only among the ignorant masses in town or country, in the form of
those very ancient superstitions which have been collected with immense
labor by learned mythologists and ethnologists; on the contrary, I
maintain that the mythical faculty still exists in all men, independently
of this survival of old superstitions, to whatever people and class they
may belong; and it will continue to exist as an innate function of the
intelligence, if not with respect to the substance, which may alter, at
any rate in the mode of its acts and proceedings.
I fear that this opinion will appear at first sight to be paradoxical and
chimerical, since it is well known that the mythical conception of the
world and its origin is gradually disappearing among civilized nations,
and it is supposed to be altogether extinct among men of culture and
intelligence. Yet I flatter myself, perhaps too rashly, that by the time
he reaches the end of this work, the reader will be convinced of the truth
of my assertion, since it is proved by so many facts, and the psychical
law from, which it results is so clear.
It must not, however, be forgotten that, in addition to the mythical
faculty of our minds, there exists the scientific faculty, the other
factor of a perfect intellectual life; the latter is most powerful in
certain races, and must in time prevail over the former, which in its
objective form precedes it; yet they are subjectively combined in practice
and are indissolubly united through life.
Undoubtedly neither the mythical nor the scientific faculty is equal and
identical in all peoples, any more than they are equal and identical in
individuals; but they subsist together, while varying in intensity and
degree, since they are both necessary functions of the intelligence.
Whether we content ourselves with studying the mental and social
conditions in the lower types of modern peoples, or go back to the
earliest times, we find men everywhere and always possessed of the power
of speech, and holding mythical superstitions, it may be of the rudest and
most elementary kind; so also do we find men possessed of rational ideas,
although they may be very simple and empirical. They have some knowledge
of the causes of things, of periods in the phenomena of nature, which they
know how to apply to the habits and necessities of their social and
individual lives.
No one, for example, would deny that many mythical superstitions, and
fanciful beliefs in invisible powers, existed among the now extinct
Tasmanians, and are now found among the Andaman islanders, the Fuegians,
the Australians, the Cingalese Veddahs, and other rude and uncultured
savages. On the other hand, those who are acquainted with their mode of
life find that savages are not absolutely devoid of intellectual activity
of an empirical kind, since they partly understand the natural causes of
some phenomena, and are able, in a rational, not an arbitrary manner, to
ascribe to laws and the necessities of things many facts relating to the
individual and to society. They are, therefore, not without the scientific
as well as the mythical faculty making due allowance for their
intellectual condition; and these primitive and natural instincts are due
to the physical and intellectual organism of human nature.
In order to pursue this important inquiry into the first and final cause
of the origin of myth, it is evidently not enough to make a laborious and
varied collection of myths, and of the primitive superstitions of all
peoples, so as to exhaust the immense field of modern ethnography.
Nor is it enough to consider the various normal and abnormal conditions of
psychical phenomena, nor to undertake the comparative study of languages,
to ascertain how far their speech will reveal the primitive beliefs of
various races, and the obscure metaphorical sayings which gave birth to
many myths. It is also necessary to subject to careful examination the
simplest elementary acts of the mind, in their physical and psychical
complexity, in order to discover in their spontaneous action the
transcendental fact which inevitably involves the genesis of the same
myth, the primary source whence it is diffused by subsequent reflex
efforts in various times and varying forms.
In speaking of the transcendental fact, it must not be supposed that I
allude to certain well-known _a priori_ speculations, which are opposed to
my temper of mind and to my mode of teaching. I only use the term
transcendental because this is actually the primitive condition of the
fact in its inevitable beginning, whatever form the mythical
representation may subsequently take. This fact is not peculiar to any
individual, people, or race, but it is manifested as an essential organism
of the human character, which is in all cases universal, permanent, and
uniform.
In order to give a clear explanation of my estimate of the _a priori_
idea, which also takes its place as the factor of experimental and
positive teaching, I must observe that for those who belong to the
historical and evolutionary school, _a priori_, so far as respects any
organism, habit, and psychological constitution in the whole animal
kingdom, in which man is also included, signifies whatever in them is
fixed and permanently organized; whatever is perpetuated by the indefinite
repetition of habits, organs, and functions, by means of the heredity of
ages. The whole history of organisms abounds with positive and repeated
proofs of this fact, which no one can doubt who is not absolutely ignorant
of elementary science. Every day adds to the number of these proofs,
demonstrating one of those truths which become the common property of
nations.
_A priori_ is therefore reduced by us to the modification of organs in
their physical and psychical constitution, as it has ultimately taken
place in the organism by the successive evolutions of forms which have
gradually become permanent, and are perpetuated by embryogenic
reproduction. This reproduction is in its turn the absolute condition of
psychical and organic facts, which are thus manifested as primitive facts
in the new life of the individual. By this law, the psychical facts,
whether elementary or complex, as they occur in the individual up to the
point of their evolution, have the necessary conditions of possibility,
and may therefore be termed a _priori_ with respect to the laws of
evolution, and to the hereditary permanence of acts performed in the
former environment of the organism at the time when they appeared.
This conception of a _priori_ is, it must be admitted, very different from
that of transcendental philosophers, who seek to prove either that an
independent artificer has not only produced the various organic forms in
their present complexity, and has specially provided the spiritual subject
with its category of thought, independently of all experience; or else
they assert the intrinsic existence of such forms in the spirit, from the
beginning of time.
In this way, as we have already said, we must not only collect the facts
which abound in history and ethnology respecting the general teaching of
myths, but we must also observe introspectively, and by pursuing the
experimental method, the primitive and fundamental psychical facts, so as
to discover the a priori conditions of the myth itself. We must ascertain,
from a careful psychological examination, the absolutely primitive origin
of all mythical representations, and how these are in their turn the
actual historical result of the same conditions, as they existed prior to
their manifestations.
It must not be supposed that in this primary fact, and in these _a priori_
psychical and organic conditions, we shall find the ulterior cause of the
various and manifold forms, or of the successive evolution of myths. This
would be a grave mistake, equal to that of transcendentalists, who imagine
that the laws which actually exist, and the order of cosmic and historic
phenomena may be determined from the independent exercise of their own
thoughts, although such laws and order can only be traced and discovered
by experience and the observation of facts. In the _a priori_ conditions
of the psychical and organic nature, and in the elementary acts which
outwardly result from them, we shall only trace the origin and necessary
source of myth, not the variable forms of its successive evolution.
The ulterior form, so far as the substance of the myth and its various
modifications are concerned, is in great part the reflex work of man; its
aspect changes in accordance with the attitude and force of the faculties
of individuals, peoples and races, and it depends on an energy to which
the _a priori_ conditions, as we have just defined them, do not strictly
apply so far as the determinate form is concerned.
It is precisely in this ulterior work of the evolution of myth, which in
the elementary fact of its primitive essence had its origin in the
predisposition of mind and body, that we may discern the interchangeable
germ and origin both of myth and science. If, therefore; the rationale of
science cannot be found in the general form of mythical representations,
the matter which serves to exercise the mind; yet the mode of its
exercise, and of the logical and psychical faculty, and the spontaneous
method pursued, are identical: the two mythical and scientific faculties
are, in fact, considered in themselves, fused into one.
As far as the origin of myth is concerned, the mode of considering its
evolution, and its organic connection with science, we differ from other
mythologists as to the sources to which they trace this immense
elaboration of the human intelligence. We may be mistaken, but we are in
any case entering on unexplored ways, and if we go astray, the boldness of
an enterprise which we undertake with diffidence pleads for indulgence.
Omitting to notice the well-known opinions on the origin of myth which
were current in classic antiquity, in the Graeco-Latin world, or in
India,[2] we restrict our inquiry to modern times subsequent to Creuzer's
learned and extensive labors. In a more scientific method, and divested
of prejudice, we propose to trace the sources of myth in general, and
among various peoples in particular.
The science of languages, or comparative philology, is the chief
instrument required in such researches, and much light has been acquired
in our days, which has led to surprising results, at least within the
sphere of the special races to which it has been applied. The names of
Kuhn, Weber, Sonne, Benfey, Grimm, Schwartz, Hanusch, Maury, Breal, Pictet,
l'Ascoli, De Gubernatis, and many others, are well known for their
marvelous discoveries in this new and arduous field. They have not only
fused into one ancient and primitive image the various myths scattered in
different forms among the Aryan races, but they have revealed the original
conception, as it existed in the earliest meaning of words before their
dispersion. Hence came the multiplicity of myths, developed in brilliant
anthropomorphic groups in different theologies, gradually becoming more
simple as time went on, then uniting in the vague primitive
personification of the winds, the storms, the sun, the dawn; in short, of
astral and meteorological phenomena.
On the other hand, Max Mueller, whose theory of original myths is peculiar
to himself, has made use of this philological instrument to prove that the
Aryan myths may at any rate be referred to a single source, namely to
metaphor, or to the double meaning of words, due to the poverty of
primitive languages. He calls this double meaning the infirmity of speech.
I do not deny that many conclusions to which some or other of the great
authorities just mentioned have arrived may be as true as they are
surprising. I also admit that this may be a certain method of
distinguishing the various mythical representations in their early
beginnings from their subsequent and complex forms. But in all the facts
which have been ascertained, or which may hereafter be ascertained, from
the comparative study of the languages of different races, no explanation
is afforded of the fact that into the natural and primitive phenomena of
myth, or, as Mueller holds, into its various metaphors, man has so far
infused his own life, that they have, like man himself, a subjective and
deliberate consciousness and force. It seems to me that this problem has
not yet been solved by scholars; they have stopped short after
establishing the primary fact, and are content to affirm that such is
human nature, which projects itself on external things.[3] This
explanation establishes a true and universal fact, but it is not the
explanation of the fact itself; yet it is not, as we shall see, incapable
of solution, and it appears to me that the ultimate source whence myths
really proceed has not been reached.
Again, if such an opinion and such a method can give us the key to the
polytheistic origin of the respective Olympuses of classic Greece and
Rome, it leaves unexplained the numerous and manifold superstitions which
philology itself proves to have existed prior to the origin of cosmic
myths. These superstitions can by no means be referred to a common source,
to the astral and meteorological myths, some of which were prior, while
others were subsequent to these superstitions.
Taking, therefore, the general and more important opinions which are now
current respecting the origin of myth, it may be said that in addition to
the systems already mentioned, two others are presented to us with the
weight of authority and knowledge; these, while they do not renounce the
appliances and linguistic analyses of the former, try to unite all the
mythical sources of mankind in general into a single head, whence all
myths, beliefs, superstitions, and religions have their origin.
While France and Germany and some other nations have achieved distinction
in this field, England has been especially remarkable for the nature of
her attempts, and the vastness of her achievements in every direction. We
pass over many great minds which were first in the field in order to dwell
on the two men who, as it seems to me, have summed up the knowledge of
others, and have formulated a theory in great measure peculiar to
themselves.
Tylor's well known name will at once suggest itself, and that of Herbert
Spencer; the former, in his great work on the "Early History of Mankind
and of Civilization," and other writings, the latter, in the first volume
of his "Sociology," and in his earlier works, have respectively
established the doctrine of the universal origin of myths on the basis of
ethnography, on the psychological examination of the primary facts of the
intelligence, and on the conception of the evolution of the general
phenomena of nature.
It would, indeed, be difficult to excel the great mind, the acute genius,
and the universal learning of Herbert Spencer, who has been termed the
modern Aristotle by a learned writer; and this is high praise when we
remember how much knowledge is necessary in our times, and in the present
conditions of science, before any one can be deemed worthy of such a
comparison. But with due respect to so great a man, and with the
diffidence of one who is only his disciple, I venture to think that
Herbert Spencer's attempt to revive, at any rate in part, Evemero's theory
of the origin of myths will not be successful, and it may prove injurious
to science. First, because all myths cannot be reduced, to personal or
historical facts; and next, because the primitive value of many of them is
so clear and distinct in their mode of expression that it is not possible
to derive them from any source but the direct personification of natural
phenomena. Nor does it appear to me to be always and altogether certain
that the origin of myths, also caused by the double personality discerned
in the shadow of the body itself, in the images reflected by liquid
substances, in echoes and visions of the night, can be all ascribed to the
worship of the dead.
The worship of the dead is undoubtedly universal. There is no people,
ancient or modern, civilized or savage, by whom it has not been practiced;
the fact is proved by history, philology and ethnography. But if the
worship of the dead is a constant form, manifested everywhere, it
flourishes and is interwoven with a multitude of other mythical forms and
superstitious beliefs which cannot in any way be reduced to this single
form of worship, nor be derived from it. This worship is undoubtedly one
of the most abundant sources of myth, and Spencer, with his profound
knowledge and keen discernment, was able to discuss the hypothesis as it
deserves; whence his book, even from this point of view, is a masterpiece
of analysis, like all those which issue from his powerful mind.
Yet even if the truth of this doctrine should be in great measure proved,
the question must still be asked how it happens that man vivifies and
personifies his own image in duplicate, or else the apparitions of dreams
or their reflections, and the echoes of nature, and ultimately the spirits
of the dead.
Tylor developed his theory more distinctly and at greater length, and he
brought to bear upon it great genius, extraordinary knowledge, and a sound
critical faculty, so that his work must be regarded as one of the most
remarkable in the history of human thought. He belongs to the school of
evolution, and his book strongly confirms the truths of that theory; since
from the primitive germs of myth, from the various and most simple forms
of fetishes among all races, he gradually evolves these rude images into
more, complex and anthropomorphic forms, until he attains the limits of
natural and positive science. He admits that there are in mankind various
normal and abnormal sources of myth, but he comes to the ultimate
conclusion that they all depend on man's peculiar and spontaneous tendency
to _animate_ all things, whence his general principle has taken the name
of _animism_. It is unnecessary to say much in praise of this learned
work, since it is known to all, and cannot be too much studied by those
who wish for instruction on such subjects.
But while assenting to his general principle, which remains as the sole
ultimate source of all mythical representation, I repeat the usual
inquiry; what causes man to animate all the objects which surround him,
and what is the cause of this established and universal fact? The
marvelous ethnographic learning of the author, and his profound analysis,
do not answer this question, and the problem still remains unsolved.
It is evident from what we have said, that the theory of the origin of
myth has of late made real and important progress in different directions;
it has been constituted by fitting methods, and with dispassionate
research, laying aside fanciful hypotheses and systems more or less
prompted by a desire to support or confute principles which have no
connection with science. We have now in great measure arrived at the
fundamental facts whence myth is derived, although, if I do not deceive
myself, the ultimate fact, and the cause of this fact, have not yet been
ascertained; namely, for what reason man personifies all phenomena, first
vaguely projecting himself into them, and then exercising a distinct
purpose of anthropomorphism, until in this way he has gradually modified
the world according to his own image.
If we are able to solve this difficult problem, a fact most important to
science and to the advancement of these special studies must result from
it: the assimilation and concentration of all the sources of myth into a
single act, whether normal or abnormal to humanity. To say that animism is
the general principle of myth does not reduce the different sources whence
it proceeds to a single psychical and organic act, since they remain
distinct and separate in their respective orbits. To attain our object, it
is necessary that the direct personification of natural phenomena, as well
as the indirect personification of metaphor; the infusion of life into a
man's own shadow, into reflex images and dreams; the belief in the reality
of normal illusions, as well as of the abnormal hallucinations of
delirium, of madness, and of all forms of nervous affections; all these
things must be resolved into a single generating act which explains and
includes them. It must be shown how and why there is found in man the
possibility of modifying all these mythical forms into an image supposed
to be external to himself, living and personal. For if we are enabled to
reply scientifically to such inquiries, we shall not only have
concentrated in a single fact all the most diverse normal and abnormal
forms of myth peculiar to man, but we shall also have given an ulterior
and analytic explanation of this fact.
I certainly do not presume to declare myself competent to effect so much,
and I am more conscious than my critics how far I fall short of my high
aim; but the modest attempt, made with the resolution to accept all
criticism offered with courtesy and good faith, does not imply culpable
presumption nor excessive vanity.
I regret to say that it is not on this point only that my theory of myth
differs from that of others; I shall not be satisfied if I only succeed in
discovering in man the primitive act which issues the general animism of
things, which becomes the substance of the ulterior myths in their
intellectual and historical evolution. It is evident, at least to those
who do not cling obstinately to old traditions, that man is evolved from
the animal kingdom. The comparative anatomy, physiology, and psychology of
man and other animals distinctly show their intimate connection in
conformation, tissues, organs, and functions, and above all, in
consciousness and intelligence. This truth, deduced from simple
observation and experiment, must lead to the conviction that all issued
from the same germ, and had the same genesis.
For those who do not cherish pedantic and sectarian prejudices, this
hypothesis is changed into assurance by modern discoveries; it is shown in
the transformations and transitions of paleontological forms; in the
embryogenic evolution of so many animals, man included, which, according
to their various species, reveals the lower types whence they issued; in
the successive forms taken by the fetus; in the powerful and indisputable
laws of selection; in the modifications by adaptation of the different
organisms, and in the effects of isolation. This is the only rational
explanation, confirmed as it is by fresh facts every day, of the
multiplicity and variety of organic forms in the lapse of time; unless,
indeed, we ascribe such variety to a miracle, even more difficult to
accept than the difficulties of the opposite-theory.
I admit that evidence for the complete demonstration of this theory is
sometimes wanting; the gaps between the fossil fauna and flora and those
of modern times are neither few nor unimportant; but on the other hand,
such proofs are accumulating, and the gaps are filled up every day, so
that we may almost assert that in some way or other, by means somewhat
different from those on which we now rely, the great rational principle of
evolution will be successfully and permanently established.
It is more than twenty years since, in ways and by study peculiar to
ourselves, we first devoted ourselves to this theory, and while we gave a
conscientious consideration to opposite theories, so as to estimate with
sincerity their importance and value, we could not relinquish our
conviction that every advance in physical, biological, and social science
served to confirm the theory of evolution.
It must not be supposed that I make any dogmatic assertion, which might
possibly be erroneous, when I say that the evidence of facts does not
contradict the assumptions of modern science. Sincere convictions should
offend no one, nor do they indicate an a priori conflict with other
beliefs. Every one is justified in thinking his own thoughts when he
speaks with moderation and supports his peculiar opinions with a certain
amount of learning.
It is not denied, even by those who oppose modern theories respecting the
genesis of organisms, that there are, excluding some psychical elements,
many and important points of resemblance between man and animals in the
exercise of their consciousness, intelligence, and emotions, if indeed
they are not identically the same. The comparative psychology of man and
animals plainly shows that the perceptions, both in their respective
organs and in their mode of action, act in the same way, especially in the
higher animals; and the origin, movements, and associations of the
imagination and the emotions are likewise identical. |
